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John Enman-Beech*

Connexion: A Note on Praxis for
Animal Advocates

Effective animal advocacy requires human-animal connexion. I apply a relational
approach to unfold this insight into a praxis for animal advocates. Connexion
grounds the affective relationships that so often motivate animal advocates.
More importantly, it enables animal agency, the ability of animals to act and
communicate in ways humans can experience and respond to. With connexion
in mind, some weaknesses of previous reform efforts become apparent. I join
these in the slogan "abolitionismas disconnexion." In so far as abolitionism draws
humans and animals apart, it undermines the movement's social basis, limits its
imaginative resources, and deprives animals of a deeper freedom. I evaluate
political theories of animals and find that only some can frame a picture of humans
and animals living together in connexion. I close by noting the limitations of the
connexion lens-we cannot simply create connexions without also evaluating
whether they are oppressive-and some practical policy measures that can be
taken today to further the goods of connexion

-

Pour 6tre efficace, /a defense des animaux exige une connexion entre /'homme
et /'animal. Japplique une approche relationnelle pour faire de ce point de vue
une praxis pour les ddfenseurs des animaux. Cette connexion est le fondement
des relations affectives qui motivent si souvent les ddfenseurs des animaux.
Plus important encore, elle permet aux animaux d'agir et de communiquer d'une
manibre que les humains peuvent experimenter et 6 laquelle ils peuvent rdagir.
En gardant 6 /'esprit la connexion, certaines faiblesses des tentatives de rdforme
antbrieures deviennent apparentes. Je les resume par le slogan <'abolitionnisme
comme d~connexion >. Dans /a mesure oD /'abolitionnisme s~pare les humains
et les animaux, il sape la base sociale du mouvement, limite ses ressources
imaginatives et prive les animaux d'une libert6 plus profonde. J'6value les theories
politiques touchant les animaux et je constate que seules certaines d'entre elles
parviennent 6 6/aborer un cadre oD les humains et les animaux vivraient ensemble
en connexion. Je termine en soulignant les limites du concept de connexion
nous ne pouvons pas simplement crder des connexions sans 6valuersi elles sont
oppressives - et j'examine certaines mesures politiques pratiques qui peuvent
6tre prises aujourd'hui pour faire avancer les m~rites de la connexion.

*
Thanks to Lesli Bisgould, Nicole D'Aoust, Jess Eisen, Angela Fernandez, Nadia Lambeck, Erica
Ritter, other participants of the Jackman Humanities Institute's Animal in the Law and Humanities
Working group, attendants at the 2017 Osgoode Graduate Law Students' Conference, two thorough
and gracious reviewers and two careful editorial assistants whose necessary anonymity distressingly
stops me from giving their due, and to Ursula and Myfanwy, for demanding-not requesting-my
attention.
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Introduction
Imagine for a moment that you are an advocate for animals. This group
is subjected to systemic violence on a grand scale. They have no legal
rights. What do you do? You might at first turn to previously successful
social movements for models, but in the case of animals, such analogies
quickly become difficult. Consciousness raising seems not an option, and
centring voice not a possibility, because animals cannot speak human
languages or engage directly with human politics. So, what do you do?
Animal advocates struggle with these questions. In this article I will argue
that fostering human-animal connexion is an important part of the answer.
The political turn in animal scholarship represents a group of scholars
who, for myriad reasons, have turned to political theory and practical
politics in their pursuit of a better world for non-human animals.' This
article takes as given the moral importance of treating animals well2 and

1.

Tony Milligan, "The Political Turn in Animal Rights" (2015) 1:1 Politics & Animals 6; Robert
&

Garner & Siobhan O'Sullivan, eds, The Political Turn in Animal Ethics (London: Rowman

Littlefield, 2016).
2.
The unsympathetic reader can consider this a thought experiment about the conditions of
successful social movements. The merely dithering reader will find elaborate explanations of the moral
considerability of animals in the classic work of Peter Singer and Tom Regan, and more recently in
Alasdair Cochrane, AnimalRights Without Liberation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012);
Bernard E Rollin, A New Basisfor Animal Ethics: Telos and Common Sense (Columbia: University
of Missouri Press, 2016); Natalie Thomas, Animal Ethics and the Autonomous Animal Self (London:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
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reads political turn scholarship for a legal praxis: a theoretically-informed
policy project that lawyers and legal scholars can undertake here and now
to further the causes of animals. Connexion serves as a useful lens in the
formation of such a praxis. In evaluating political theories of animals and
thinking about how to act on them, we should attend to how theories and
policies bring humans and animals together or move them apart.
Human-animal connexion is necessary both to foster the affective
relationships that for many humans are the basis of caring about animals
and to enable the agency of animals in (currently) human-centred
political structures. And so, all else being equal, we should seek reforms
that increase connexion while being careful that such connexion is not
oppressive. To demonstrate this thesis, I take a look at political theories
of animals through the connexion lens, use this lens to critique current
abolitionist-oriented reform efforts, and point to some new directions for
policy that connexion suggests. Attention to the structures of connexion
and disconnexion that allow animal-exploitative industries to continue
can ground a praxis that accounts for the limits of law and democracy.
In Part I, I explain what I mean by connexion and two reasons why it
matters. Here, connexion is figured relationally: not just a thing between
a person and her dog but a set of social structures that either promote or
fail to promote the goods of connexion. These goods are, first, affective
relationships: from bare awareness to loving connexions between animals
and humans and animals; and, second, enabled animal agency: the ability
of animals to act and communicate in ways humans can experience and
respond to.
Connexion provides the basis of a critique of abolitionist efforts,
which I undertake in Part II. Shortly, abolitionism (of a certain variety)
is a spectacular rejection of connexion. "Abolitionism as disconnexion"
turns out to unify many critiques of abolitionist efforts in one travel-sized
aphorism. In pursuing a practice of disconnexion, abolitionism cannot
compass important lessons we have learned about successful legal reforms.
Part III looks to political turn scholarship that takes up the themes
of the critique of abolitionism just sketched. Political turn scholarship
sees the need for state-oriented, structural policy tools over the quixotic
pursuit of individual revelatory moments.3 By dint of being political, it is
premised on the need for a politics: both a conceivably stable end-game

3. Gregory Smulewicz-Zucker, "Bringing the State into Animal Rights Politics" in Paola Cavalieri,
ed, Philosophy and the Politics ofAnimal Liberation (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2016) 239
[Cavalieri, Politics ofLiberation].
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for humans and animals and a path to get us there. As Tony Milligan puts
it, "philosophical argument cannot be left to do all the work of practical
reason. We also need to be able to picture life in realistic and imaginative
ways."' I focus particularly on Robert Garner's A Theory of Justice for
Animals6 and Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka's Zoopolis.' Garner,
Donaldson, and Kymlicka all reject abolitionism (in the sense I mean) as
part of a viable political theory, but I find that Donaldson and Kymlicka's
work better stomachs the lessons of connexion. In Zoopolis, they picture
new, "realistic and imaginative ways" of living with animals, focussing on
the creation of structures of just human/non-human relations.
In concluding, I note some of the limitations of this framing. Chiefly,
connexion is not all there is: a policy must be evaluated along a number
of other axes as well. I then describe some reforms that could promote
connexion, emblematized by the legalization of back-yard chicken coops.
These suggestions are not supposed to be the end of the conversation, but
the start of one, and so I finish with a call to others to engage in animal
advocacy as an on-going deliberative activity drawing us animals all
together.
I. Connexion- What is it and why
Inspired by Jennifer Nedelsky's relational theory,' eco-feminism and
feminist care ethics,9 this article posits connexion as a useful frame
for the evaluation of political theories of animals and the formation of
praxis therefrom. By connexion I refer to any relationship, interaction or
communication between animals and humans. At its loosest, connexion
occurs when a human learns about an animal-a tenuous connexion is
formed when a consumer picks up a product with accurate labelling about

4.
Marcel Wissenburg & David Schlosberg, "Introducing Animal Politics and Political Animals" in
Marcel Wissenburg & David Schlosberg, eds, PoliticalAnimalsandAnimal Politics(London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2014) 1; Marcel Wissenburg, "An agenda for animal political theory" [Wissenburg, "An
agenda"] in ibid 30 at 30-36.
5.
Tony Milligan, BeyondAnimalRights:food, pets and ethics (London: Continuum, 2010) 4, citing
Cora Diamond, "Eating meat and eating people" in Cora Diamond, The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein,
Philosophy, and the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991) 319.
6.

Robert Gamer, A Theory ofJusticeforAnimals: Animal Rights in a Non-ideal World (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2013) ["Gamer 2013"].
7.
Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011) [Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis].
8.

Jennifer Nedelsky, Law s Relations:A Relational Theory of Self Autonomy, andLaw (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2011).
9.
E.g., Stephanie Collins, The Core of Care Ethics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Lori
Gruen, Entangled Empathy: An Alternative Ethic for our Relationships with Animals (Brooklyn:

Lantern Books, 2015).
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the animals that produced it.10 At its tightest, we have connexions between
humans and companion animals, who share together a living space and
the everyday details of each other's lives. Animal-animal connexions will
also be relevant: as, e.g., a praxis of ethical cow-keeping, if there is such a
thing, must enable connexion between a cow and her calf.11
I have just sketched what I mean by connexion before delving into
the two reasons why I consider it important: enabling animal agency and
affective relationships. But the full picture of connexion can only come
after that because I want a conception of connexion that ties it to these
reasons: connexion is that which allows humans and animals to be affected
by other animals, and it is the basis of attachment. And defining connexion
in this way allows me to assert that connexion is in general good.12
It is clearly possible for human-animal connexions to be problematic.
Bestiality is an extreme example. More generally, it seems there are many
animals-say in wild habitats that we might destroy in the pursuit of some
resource-who are best left alone. As I will explore in the final section,
there are certainly limits to what connexion can do, but in general, and
as the ensuing sections should demonstrate, seeking opportunities for
connexion points our thinking in the right direction.
1. Deliberatinganimals
We are commonly thought to live in a democracy where an important form
of political participation is reasoned deliberation.13 But can non-human
animals deliberate? Clemens Driessen has argued that they can."1 Animals
cannot engage in the sort of ideal deliberation sometimes imagined by
democratic theorists-using symbolic thought to come to dispassionate
positions. But to some extent, the human ability to deliberate is also
over-rated-we are ignorant, passionate, and we come to decisions in
systematically biased ways." And so, some have turned away from
political participation as primarily about language or thought, and instead

&

10. This is the sort of reason I speak of connexion rather than community. Community, no doubt,
must also be part of a political vision for animals. But it seems to me that humans can care for animals
and that animals can be agentic with respect to those humans, without being in community with them,
as in the labelling example.
11. Jessica Eisen, "Mother's Milk: Law and Animal Parenthood" (Relational Autonomy Workshop,
University of Toronto, 28 January 2017) [unpublished].
12. There is a case to be made that connexion is a good in itself. I do not make it, focussing instead
on its potential instrumental value.
13. Lucy J Parry, "Deliberative Democracy and Animals: Not So Strange Bedfellows" in Garner
O'Sullivan, supra note 1 at 137; Bruce Ackerman & James S Fishkin, DeliberationDay (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2004).
14. Clemens Driessen, "Animal Deliberation" in Wissenburg & Schlosberg, supra note 4 at 90.
15. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (Toronto: Doubleday, 2011), giving a model of
human thinking based on current research.
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toward reading all the everyday exchanges of interaction and interest as
sites of politics.1 6 Actions, in this understanding, can be deliberative. And
so, when animals can act, they can be political.
Bruno Latour uses the example of the cat-door.1 7 Cats kept as pets are
prone to sit next to doors or windows and mieaou. Humans often interpret
this as expressing a desire to be let out-side (cats generally only mieaou
outside doors or windows that they can hope to be let through), and so they
go and open the door for the cat. The cat might go outside." Some humans
will install a cat-sized door in the door or window. This is equipped with a
flap that keeps out a draft, but allows the cat in and out. Thus cats' freedom
is increased-they no longer need a human to let them out-and humans
no longer have to get up to do it. According to Driessen, the progress of
the cat door
is only meaningful if you trace the changes in actors and doors together.
[The human] is involved in a collective learning process in which new
subjectivities emerge, and the legitimacy of their claims and desires
are explored in interaction, by tinkering with their shared material
conditions. 9
Similarly, Donaldson and Kymlicka cite the example of a Canadian visiting
France, where she sees that dogs are common in public spaces. This causes
the Canadian, who notices that "civilization hasn't collapsed" and there
are no obvious health issues, to reconsider the restrictive treatment of
dogs in public here.2 0 Thus non-human animals, just by their presence,
just by doing what dogs do, can act as "agents of change."2 1 This example
demonstrates, in addition, that the result of attention to animals is not just
a better understanding of their preferences but also a reconfiguring of

16.
17.

Driessen, supra note 14 at 96-97.
Bruno Latour, "A door must be either open or shut: a little philosophy of techniques" in

Andrew Feenberg & Alastair Hannay, eds, Technology and the Politics ofKnowledge (Bloomington:

University of Indiana Press, 1995) 272, as cited inDriessen, supranote 14 at 92-93. While Latour uses
the cartoon figure of Gaston Lagaffe as the protagonist of this example, I have generalised.
18. Though it is a trope of cat jokes that they will change their minds and refuse to go outside, or
immediately want to come back in: for example, Kate Beaton: <http://www.harkavagrant.com/index.
php?id= 173>. And TS Eliot, describing a cat: "The Rum Tum Tugger is a terrible bore: When you let
him in, then he wants to be out; He's always on the wrong side of every door, And as soon as he's at
home, then he'd like to get about": Old Possum s Book ofPracticalCats (London: Faber and Faber,
1974) at 21.
19. Driessen, supra note 14 at 92.
20. See note 48 infra and the accompanying text below.
21. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 at 114. See also Paola Cavalieri, "Animal
Liberation: A Political Perspective" in Cavalieri, Politics of Liberation, supra note 3, 15 at 32-34,
explaining animals as agents of history, effecting change, active or passive acquiescence to human
dominion, and resistance, sometimes violent.
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our conceptual schema. Seeing dogs in France might prompt someone to
reconceive dogs as shared users of public space rather than as a source of
danger, just as working with a detection dog might prompt a police officer
to see them as a co-worker, and living with a pet might prompt someone
to see them as a family member.2 2 Seeing an animal in one of these roles
more regularly would likely reinforce this conception.2 3
Whether it is a cat mieaouing until a human builds them a cat door, or
a cow refusing to use a new automatic milking machine until it is made
comfortable and equipped with enticements, animals
can express preferences when provided with a range of non-coercive
alternatives... .They can be found to protest and dissent, such as by
refusing to cooperate in the ways envisaged by their human keepers.24
This prompts Driessen to give a test of sorts of a kind of human practice
in relation to animals that might be off limits: "those that disallow the
flourishing of animals to such an extent that they are unable to engage
in common non-discursive articulation of their preferences."25 But
this expresses "articulation of preferences" as an individual act; it only
looks to the animal side of what is in fact a relational process of nondiscursive articulation and, on the human side, listening.2 6 To activate
animal deliberation, not only must animals be allowed to flourish, to be
given "a range of non-coercive alternatives," to the point that they can
communicate in this sense, but also humans must be encouraged to listen.
And in order to listen, they must be within hearing range. And so,
. . such an understanding
the institutionalisation of
multispecies communities
those they in various ways

implies a shift from a focus primarily on
legal rights for animals, towards nurturing
in which humans learn to be responsive to
share their world with. 7

For animals to be agents, in other words, we need connexion.

22. Will Kymlicka, "Social Membership: Animal Law beyond the Property/Personhood Impasse"
(2017) 40 Dal U 123.
23. Kymlicka, ibid at 151: "social recognition of others as co-workers is easier when we interact
with them on an everyday basis, in a setting of trust, cooperation, and sociability."
24. Driessen, supra note 14 at 95.
25. Ibid at 93.
26.

Alison Suen, The Speaking Animal: Ethics, Language, and the Human-Animal Divide (London:

Rowman & Littlefield, 2015) canvasses the difficulties with animal voices speaking and humans
listening at ch 1.
27. Driessen, supra note 14 at 95.
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2. Affective relationships
Affective relationships are another potential good of connexion.2 8 It has
become painfully clear to animal advocates that caring about animals in
the abstract does not generally motivate transformative change. Feelings
of love for a pet, general protestations against animal cruelty, and moral
philosophical argument,2 9 rarely translate into personal change like
vegetarianism, let alone support for broad policy change. Public education
campaigns premised on inducing "personal transformative moments"3 0
have stalled in the face cognitive and habitual bariers that prevent the
moments in the first place,3 1 and remission very often results even when
such moments have occurred: there are many more former vegetarians in
the USA than current vegetarians.3 2
Eco-feminists and others have long applied ethics of care to animal
studies,3 3 stressing the importance of affective relationships-both to
28. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 at 79 and 255. Here I am using "affective
relationship" in a broad sense. It is not confined to the sort of relationship that one has with a pet, nor to
relationships which have some mutuality, where a human loves a non-human and the non-human loves
them back: June Dwyer, "A non-companion species manifesto: humans, wild animals, and 'the pain
of anthropomorphism"' (2007) 72:3 South Atlantic Review 73. Because I am thinking of affective
relationships as motivational resources for animal advocacy, any relationship where a human has
some kind of positive feeling for an animal will do. In most cases, this certainly includes a relationship
with a pet, but it likely does not include for example the (tenuous) relationship between a human and
the battery hen whose eggs she buys in the store. Note that not all feelings are good feelings, and an
important part of building relationships between humans and non-human animals is structuring them
so that the feelings involved are generally positive. See text accompanying notes 37-39.
29. Comedian Louis CK, in a stand-up routine, gave this discourse on akrasia: "I think it's wrong
to eat tuna, and dolphin and cows and everything. But I eat them. I eat them all. Because, I don't care
that it's wrong. I totally think it's terrible, but that's not important to me that it's terrible. So what if it's
wrong; it tastes good. And I like the way it feels when I eat it, so fuck it. But I'm not going to pretend
I'm doing something that's okay just 'cause it doesn't think or something." "Louis CK's Justification
for Eating Meat," online: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r3cOTHQbdDE>.
30. Kim Stallwood, "Animal Rights: Moral Crusade or Social Movement?" in John Sorenson, ed,
CriticalAnimal Studies: Thinking the Unthinkable (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2014) 298 at

308-312.
31. Francione & Garner, infra note 55 at 147-154; Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7
at 252-253: "Moral arguments are notoriously ineffective when they run so fully against the grain of
self-interest and inherited expectations... We're willing to act on our moral convictions when it costs
us relatively little, but not when it requires us to give up our standard of living or way of life"; Elisa
Aaltola, "The Problem of Akrasia: Moral Cultivation and Socio-Political Resistance" in Cavalieri,
Politics ofLiberation,supra note 3, 117.

32. About five times as many: Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka, "Make It So: Envisioning a
Zoopolitical Revolution" in Politics ofLiberation, note 3 above 71 at 75-76 [Donaldson & Kymlicka,
"Make It So"], citing Che Green, "How Many Former Vegetarians and Vegans Are There?," Humane
Research Council, 2 December 2014, online: <https://faunalytics.org/how-many-former-vegetariansand-vegans-are-there/>.
33.

E.g., Josephine Donovan & Carol J Adams, Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethic

for the Treatment ofAnimals (New York: Continuum, 1996); Linda Vance, "Ecofeminism and the
Politics of Reality" in Greta Gaard, ed, Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1993) 118 at 136: "For many of us, empathy toward the non-human world is the
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ground and motivate advocacy and as valuable in their own right.34
Political turn scholars have recently stressed that decision-making and
action, similarly, do not follow "rationally" from philosophical principles,
turning their gaze instead to the social and structural conditions that
perpetuate contested views and practices.35 Structures encouraging
affective relationships between humans and animals should be part of this
in order to mobilize an ever broader base for animal policies. Promoting
connexion can bring those who love animals into the fold.36
Here is one place a thicker form of connexion may need to come into
play. Steven McMullen and Siobhan O'Sullivan have both noted that there
is no clear evidence behind the common supposition that mere exposure
to animal suffering will induce a caring reaction.37 Indeed, it seems to
McMullen that "agricultural communities that are closest to animal use
are not the sources of most animal activism." 38 Even still, McMullen and
others have argued that it is the presence of a pecuniary interest that turns
what could be a positive affective relationship into one of exploitation.39
heart of our political stance. We are not persuaded to be vegetarians only because someone argues
that animals have inherent rights too, but also by feeling an intuitive kinship with them, or..."; Daniel
Engster, "Care ethics and animal welfare" (2006) 37:4 Journal of Social Philosophy 521. It may
seem that I have got care ethics precisely backwards, speaking as though it is moral to form affective
relationships when, rather, care ethics asserts that relationships that exist generate moral obligations:
Collins, supranote 9. This distinction is muddied though when we are already in relationships, as with
domesticated animals. Either way, political turn scholarship offers a chance to situate a care-based
ethic in political rather than moral theory.
34.

Kathy Rudy, Loving Animals: Toward a New Animal Advocacy (Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press, 2011); Kurtis Boyer, "The Limits of Species Advocacy" in Wissenburg & Schlosberg,
supra note 4, 123 at 124.
35. Aaltola, supra note 31; Donaldson & Kymlicka, "Make It So," supra note 32 at 73: changing
hegemonic practices is "not only, or even primarily a process of changing a person's conscious
beliefs. The habitus is equally a matter of embodied habits and unreflective knowledge, belief, and
behaviours"; Smulewicz-Zucker, supra note 3.
36. There are many who interact with animals in ways that, while not in keeping with an ideal
veganism, still seem to respect animals in some sense that others do not. For this reason, some have
argued that we need to soften calls for veganism, or at least make clear that being a perfect vegan is
not a requirement for membership in the ranks of animal supporters: Rollin, supra note 2 at 12-13;
Donaldson & Kymlicka, "Make It So," supra note 32 at 91-94.
37. Steven McMullen, Animals and the Economy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) at 79-81;
Siobhan O'Sullivan, Animals, Equality, Democracy (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) at 45-51.
38. McMullen, ibid at 80. The basis for McMullen's claim is unclear and may be anecdote. Even
were the claim true, the base probability of a person being from an agricultural community would need
to be considered in order to make a claim about whether people from such communities are more or
less likely to become animal advocates.
39. McMullen, ibid. McMullen mentions, as other reasons agricultural communities are not hot-beds
of activism, that animal agriculture could be less harmful than is argued, that people in agricultural
communities were likely socialized in a setting that normalizes violence against animals, and that
people less empathetic toward animals might self-select into animal-exploitative jobs. See also
O'Sullivan, supra note 37 at 48-49, citing James M Jasper & Dorothy Nelkin, The Animal Rights
Crusade: The Growth ofa Moral Protest(New York: The Free Press, 1992).

554

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Thus we might expect that people with no financial interest in animal
exploitation will, when connected with animals, be more likely to form
positive relationships. This is the situation of the regular consumer of meat.
Whether or not this is right, my claim is simply that connexion is only a
necessary and not a sufficient condition for positive affective relationships.
Without connexion, we cannot mobilize the powerful emotions that
such relationships can instil, and we may be missing something of noninstrumental value besides. Connexion-promoting social structures will
mobilize those emotions, and effect that value, in an on-going, regular,
and self-reinforcing way.
Even where good feelings are successfully fostered, they are not the
end of the story. As Catharine MacKinnon notes, "Loving women is an
improvement over hating them, kindness to animals is an improvement
over cruelty, but neither has freed them nor recognizes their existence
on their own terms.""o Attention to the other good of connexionanimal deliberation-goes some way to addressing this concern. What
remains seems to be not a question of the preferability of connexion or
disconnexion, but of the importance of other frameworks such as justice
or respect in evaluating practices.
3. Connexion as a praxis
Only with meaningful connexion do we get animal deliberation-functional
animal participation in our political communities-as well as the affective
relationships that for so many are their prime motivations for animal
advocacy. Connexion might also achieve dramatic new intersubjectivities
of the sort imagined by Donna Haraway with unforeseeable results." This
model recognises the impossibility of a complete separation of humans
from non-humans-since relations are inevitable, we should focus on
structuring them well.42
Legal advocacy is not restricted to the enshrinement and protection
of rights. There is a role here for the "animal lawyer" (a lawyer in private
practice who takes primarily cases involving animals) because an animal
lawyer engages in the everyday navigation of interspecies interactions,

40.

Catharine AMacKinnon, "Of Mice and Men: A Feminist Fragment on Animal Rights" in Cass R

Sunstein & Martha C Nussbaum, eds, Animal Rights: CurrentDebates and New Directions (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2004) 263 at 265. Thanks to Jess Eisen for bringing this passage to my
attention.
41. Donna Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness

(Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003). Similarly: Gruen, supra note 9 at 75-80, describing "altered
states of perception."
42. Jennifer Nedelsky makes this same conceptual move in a human context, Nedelsky, supra note
8 at 118-120; and see Gruen, ibid at 1-2, 63-64.

Connexion: A Note on Praxis for Animal Advocates

555

and can help to construct a world in which human/non-human community
is facilitated and encouraged. The drafting of pet trust provisions, the
negotiation of animal custody, the pursuit of animal welfare or cruelty
cases, can each be a part of creating a world where human/non-human
animal connexions are normalised within a legal structure.43
We thus have a scheme for another sort of policy campaign, one which
could be run alongside and in support of campaigns to end factory farming
or to promote ethical diets. This campaign would see as desirable moves
that bring humans and non-humans closer together. The intensification of
modem farming occurred at precisely the time that antibiotics allowed
farm animals to be hidden away. 4 If more people understood the scale
and violence of modem animal farming, I believe they would resist eating
its products. "The available evidence suggests," write Donaldson and
Kymlicka, "that many human cultures have viewed the killing of animals
as a tragic necessity." Many people today view the eating of meat as a
health necessity (though this position often lacks scientific support)." But
convincing them that it is not necessary will be much simpler if we can
convince them that any such necessity is tragic. Bringing humans and
animals back into connexion is a necessary step in achieving this.
There are ways law already structures human/non-human relationships
that prevent public deliberation and the flourishing of affective

43. A good illustration of the difficulty of Gary Francione's abolitionist position, discussed below,
can be found in his derision for what animal lawyers do, "animal law": "Reflections on Animals,
Property and the Law and Rain Without Thunder" inAnimals as Persons (2008) 67 at 116-123. This

includes, for example, pet custody, wrongful death, veterinary malpractice, pet cruelty, and pet trusts:
117. Francione describes the increasing number of animal law practices (and animal law courses in
universities), saying that they "may, indeed, provide career opportunities for lawyers, but they will
also reinforce the property paradigm rather than challenge it" at 117. Francione cannot see the value
of this sort of practice because of his commitment to an individualistic approach to animal rights.
He argues that, for example, the drafting of trust provisions in wills does nothing to advance the
cause of animals, but must be motivated by the lawyers' "business considerations" which he, in his
Rutgers [University] Animal Rights Clinic, did not have to worry about, at 123. He does not, then, see
animal law as playing a role in building a new legal system for all animals. Instead, he recommends
that lawyers interested in animal advocacy should "protect the rights of those [he means humans] in
society who [are] trying to cause a paradigm shift in thinking"; that is, the "[human] social activist" is
the agent of change, not the lawyer and certainly not the animals, at 122. Protecting the civil rights of
animal activists (e.g., their freedom of expression, their ability to conscientiously refuse dissection in
schools or meals in prisons, their freedom of association in lawful boycotts) is indeed important, but
there are other things that animal lawyers can do. Along similar lines, see Alasdair Cochrane, "Labour
Rights for Animals" in The Political Turn, supra note 1 at 15, working through what sort of system
would be needed to secure the dignity of productive animals; and Kymlicka, supra note 22 at 140,
arguing that attempts to establish trusts for the benefit of animals (among other animal law practice
issues) are part of recognizing companion animals as family members.
44. Bisgould, infra note 108 at 162.
45. Jesse Singal, "The 4 ways people rationalize eating meat," New York Magazine (4 June 2015),
online: <http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2015/06/4-ways-people-rationalize-eating-meat.html>.
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relationships.46 For instance, there are municipal laws limiting the keeping
of animals outside of a limited set of allowable pets." There are similar
laws limiting companion animals in public and private spaces"-even a
person's "own" living space.49 The public-private divide, which has been
used to prop up the subjugation of women within "private" households,
continues to prop up the subjugation of animals: factory farms are able
to use the law of trespass and new "ag gag""o laws to prevent others from
knowing what goes on inside them. (And the pursuit of ag gag legislation
by lobbying groups is a good piece of evidence that exposure of these
industries works.) Intensifying population density-encouraged by zoning
laws-means that fewer people have the opportunity for even the minimal
interaction of driving by a pasture where cows may or may not be visible.
Zoning laws also keep agricultural areas distinct from residential areas.
Building codes reproduce spaces that are unfit for animals. Dogs are seen
as dangerous in schools or shopping malls and restricted on this basis."
The law of nuisance limits where and how non-farm52 animals can be kept
and seems to function only to keep them out of the sight (and the range
of other senses) of humans. In family law separation disputes, the human/
non-human relationships involving a pet might be ignored by a test that
treats the pet as only property.53 The list goes on, and every one of these
sites of law structuring the human/non-human divide is open to advocacy

46. When I talk of current municipal, provincial, or national law, I refer to my home turf of Toronto,
Ontario, and Canada except where specified.
47. Toronto Municipal Code c 349, Animals, 13 June 2013, online: <http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/
municode/1184_349.pdf>.
48. Property law allows establishments to refuse pets, and food safety regulations in Ontario ban
pets from areas with table service: Alyshah Hasham, "How dog-friendly is Toronto?" The Toronto
Star (5 November 2012), online: <http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2012/11/05/how dogfriendlyis
toronto.html>.

49. No-pet provisions in residential leases are void in Ontario, but there is no restriction on a landlord
initially refusing to let to a tenant because they have a pet (unless there is a discriminatory ground at
play). In other provinces, no-pet provisions are enforceable. Under certain circumstances, condos can
enforce no-pets rules: Residential TenanciesAct SO 2006 c 17 §14; Bisgould, infra note 108 at 148154.
50. That is, laws which gag people from talking about agriculture: Mark Bittman, "Who Protects the
Animals?" New York Times (26 April 2011), online: <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/
who-protects-the-animals/>. Mark Bittman appears to have coined the term "ag-gag," which refers
to laws, increasingly common in the USA, which criminalize the audio and/or visual recording of
animals in agricultural contexts and/or the distribution of such recordings. These laws stand on top of
the traditional protections of trespass law. See Alan K Chen and Justin Marceau, "High Value Lies,
Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment" (2015) 68:6 Vand L Rev 1435 at 1439 n 9 and 1469-1471.
51. See supra note 48.
52. Farm operations are protected by legislation from nuisance claims in every Canadian province:
Bisgould, infra note 108 at 166, 189-190.
53. Bisgould, infra note 108 at 154-157.
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and challenge. Each of them can be shifted to facilitate connexion and
human/non-human relationships.
II. Abolitionism as disconnexion
Here I draw critiques of one legal reform practice-abolitionismtogether through the theme of disconnexion. Roughly, abolitionism is the
animal advocacy practice that views the only good type of reform as one
that moves us closer to abolishing all use of animals by humans. Veganism
is its emblematic movement. In the introduction, I wrote "abolitionism (of
a certain variety)." This is because my target here is a specific brand of
abolitionism." Some abolitionisms are not like the others. In so far as an
"abolitionist" position can be made to address the issues out-lined here, all
the better. The abolitionism I target provides an illustration of the use of
connexion to evaluate praxis.
This legal reform argument-typified by Gary Francione but accepted
by many others"-moves from the moral worth of animals to the abolition
of all animal use, including all domestication. It goes like this.
1. Animals have moral worth. Here I use "moral worth" as a broad
term to capture whatever it is that makes animals morally similar to
humans.56

54. Specifically, a strong species egalitarian, extinctionist, direct form of abolitionism. An
abolitionism without any one of these features will be less open to the critique of this section. On
strongvs weak species egalitarianism and extinctionism, see Tony Milligan,Animal Ethics: The Basics
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015) at 178 and 180. On direct vs indirect animal rights projects, see
John Hadley, Animal PropertyRights (London: Lexington Books, 2015) at 104-109.
55. For a thorough statement, see Gary L Francione, "Animals-Property or Persons?" in Francione,
supra note 43, 25, and generally Gary L Francione & Robert Garner, The Animal Rights Debate:
Abolition or Regulation? (2010). I use the numbered argument presented in the text as a model for
critique, but the reader may wonder whether this model argument can really be found in the wild
other than among a few extremists. The term abolitionism captures a broad range of ideas and some
abolitionists will not see themselves in the model. While the argument of this section applies to nonextinctionist abolitionisms (that do not fully accept point three of the numbered argument) in so far as
they advocate human-animal disconnexion, it applies most forcefully to extinctionist abolitionisms.
I use just the term abolitionism through-out the text in part because extinctionism and abolitionism
tend to go together, and in part because extinctionism is sometimes taken to follow from abolitionist
premisses. Milligan, supra note 1, writes that abolitionism "is closely allied to extinctionism" at 7;
and that "abolitionism solves the problem [of 'the end-game of animal rights'] by fell-swoop by
embracing extinctionism" at 8. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supranote 7 refer in their text to an
"abolitionist/extinctionist approach" at 77, calling "the eradication of currently existing domesticated
species... a hallmark" of the position at 78, noting that "many [animal rights] theorists and activists
share Francione's view" on extinctionism, at 272. It may be that these political turn authors are
drawing too direct an association between abolitionism and extinctionism for rhetorical purposes.
That said, if my critique encourages abolitionists to spell out how their form of abolitionism furthers
the goods of connexion, it will have succeeded.
56. More specific formulations that have each received their own defences are: animals are sentient,
are subjects-of-a-life, are ends in themselves...
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2.

In law and morality, there are only persons and things and only
persons have moral worth. Because animals have moral worth, they
are therefore persons and not property." Persons, and therefore
animals, have basic negative rights against being interfered with by
others without consent.
3. Animals cannot give meaningful consent to human interaction.
Therefore, there can be no right human interaction with animals.
Humans and animals must live apart, and animals who have come
to rely on humans for survival should be extinguished, perhaps by
sequestration to prevent any further reproduction.59
It is point three that makes this an "extinctionist" abolitionism and so
particularly susceptible to the critique I will draw out.60 And to this mostly
ethical argument is added a legal argument about how point 3 can be
practically effected.
4. Property in law has no intrinsic worth. So, as long as animals are
property, whenever a legal decision about animals is made the interests
of the animals have no legal foot-hold. The interests of humans will
always govern. 6 1 We must therefore change the legal status of animals
from property to person.
Even before we get to the implicit political theory behind it, there are some
particular problems with the praxis suggested by point 4.
1. Property is not despotic dominion
Point 4 espouses a particular view of property. The idea that owning
something implies complete dominion over it-to be used, abused,
alienated or destroyed as the owner sees fit-is not today an accurate
57. Francione, supra note 55 at 61-62: "if we extend the right not to be property to animals, then
animals will become moral persons.... [As between persons and things, t]here is no third choice."
58. The usual target of abolitionist theory is animal use by humans (e.g. Francione, supra note 55
at 1, 9-10, 51), with use, I submit, understood as just non-consensual interaction There may be such
a thing as non-consensual interaction that is non-use. We might imagine an exception that allows
interaction in health emergencies, as is currently the law for humans, or a best interests exception such
as currently applies to incapable humans who have not made their wishes known. These possibilities do
not detract from my argument in so far as they still relegate connexion to a minimal and extraordinary
role.
59. Francione, supra note 55 at 128. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 raise the spectre
of "systematic sterilization" at 77. Jam drawing out what Milligan, supra note 1, refers to as "familiar
abolitionist assumptions.. connecting an end of property status with extinctionism" at 14. On whether
this point should be considered under the label "abolitionism," see note 55 above.
60. See note 54 above.
61. Francione, supra note 55 at 38: "it is, of course, absurd to suggest that we can balance human
interests... against the interests of [their animal] property, which exists only as a means to the ends of
humans"; animal property "exists solely for our use and has no value except that which we give it";
and at 43: "Thus, because animals are our property, the law will require their interests to be observed
only to the extent that it facilitates the exploitation of the animal."
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description our legal system, if it ever was.6 2 A popular alternate view is
that property is a varying bundle of rights.6 3 The bundle of rights varies
widely depending on the type of property. For example, there are many
restrictions on how one can transfer a home, imposed by registration
laws; and on the circumstances in which one can bum it to the ground,
imposed by the CriminalCode. If it is a heritage building, there are further
restrictions on what one can do with it.6 4 If it has a side-walk, municipal
by-laws require it to be shovelled. Intellectual property behaves by its own
statutory rules, and yet it too is "property." Some animal rights scholars
have noticed that there is an illogical leap from "animals are property" to
"their owners can do anything with them," and so have called for explicit
intermediate categories that recognise the possession of animals as coming
with its own special restrictions and duties. 6 5
Given, though, that animals' property status does obvious symbolic
violence to their dignity, it is tempting to suppose that doing away with
it would be an unalloyed good even if it would not solve all animals'
problems. On the other hand, Larissa Katz argues that the restrictions
and duties that come with property are so pervasive that they deserve
recognition as a distinctive form of governance: governing through

&

62. It is associated with the many impressive metaphors of William Blackstone's Commentaries.
"That fole and defpotic dominion which one man claims and exercifes over the external things of
the world, in total exclufion of the right of any other individual in the univerfe": William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 2 (1765-1769) 2, online: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_
century/blackstone bk2chl.asp>.
63. This view is associated with the work of Wesley Newcombe Hohfeld. Thomas W Merrill
Henry E Smith, "What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?" (2001) 111 Yale U 357 at 365.
64. Wendy Adams discusses this example in "Human Subjects and Animal Objects: Animals
as 'Other' in Law" (2009) 3:1 J Animal L & Ethics 29 at 33. I do not agree with Adams that the
protection of heritage properties is necessarily for the enjoyment of people and cannotbe (in addition)
a recognition of cultural heritage as valuable in its own right. Possibly Adams' conclusion is related
to accepting the assumption noted above, that in law there are only persons and things, subjects and
objects, and only persons have moral worth or legal rights (text accompanying supra note 55): Adams
at 32.
65. For example, David S Favre, "A New Property Status for Animals" in Sunstein & Nussbaum,
supra note 40 at 234; Wissenburg, "An agenda," supra note 4 at 42-43; McMullen, supra note 37 chs
9-11 provide an argument grounded in economics; Cass R Sunstein, "Slaughterhouse Jive,"
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owners.6 6 Looking at the issue of non-human animals this way, we see
that there are already restrictions on the absolute dominion over animals
as property, particularly in the case of pets.6 7 Though these restrictions
are missing where they are most needed, we can ask whether a broader
regulatory response to the plight of animals is possible precisely through
maintaining (some aspect of) animals' property status. If an animal has a
guardian, you know who is responsible for it: so perhaps animals' legal
status, under whatever name, should continue to define a human-animal
connexion that can be regulated.68
In fact, owners of animal property already have some special privileges
over other owners,6 9 suggesting that the full regulatory potential of a
property status for animals has not been explored. Francione argues that the
property status itself stands in the way of better protections. 70 Abolitionists
identify real challenges that arise in how we relate to animals, especially
those that have been bred into dependency on humans, bred for the very
purpose of exploitation. Changing the property status of animals will not
make these challenges go away (though it might help). As evidence for
this claim, I will now discuss the hap-hazard way that changes in the legal
status of marginalized human groups have and have not cashed out to their
material benefit: in other words, law mistreats people too.
2. Law mistreatspeople too
There is some Kantian categoricalism afoot in the idea that there is a
necessary connexion between the personhood/property distinction and
things having either some or no intrinsic worth-namely, that persons
have complete intrinsic worth and items of property have none. This gives
us reason to doubt how far making animals legal persons will help, if most
people are not moved by such categoricalism.
The person-thing distinction is thoughtto function as the discursive root
of many forms of oppression.7 1 If we understand the inhuman to have no

The New Republic (29 January 2001), online: <https://newrepublic.com/article/63234/slaughterhousejive>.
66. Larissa Katz, "Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Private Property Rights
Enhance State Power" (2012) 160:7 U Penn L Rev 2029.
67. See text accompanying notes 108-112 below.
68. Wissenburg, "An agenda," supra note 4 at 42; and see McMullen's view at infra note 127.
69. Ag-gag laws and exemptions from nuisance laws being two examples: see supranotes 50, 52.
70. See supra note 61.
71. Eduardo Mendieta, "Animal Is to Kantianism as Jew Is to Fascism: Adorno's Bestiary" in John
Sanbonmatsu, ed, Critical Theory and Animal Liberation (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011)

147; Maneesha Deckha, "Critical Animal Studies and Animal Law" (2012) 18:2 Animal L 207 at 219223; Anna Grear, "Deconstructing Anthropos: A Critical Reflection on 'Anthropocentric' Law and
Anthropocene 'Humanity"' (2015) 26:3 L & Critique 225.
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value, we can oppress others (whether people or animals) on the basis that
they, or parts of them, perhaps dominant parts, are animalistic or not fully
human, and therefore things of no value. Charles de Bovelles' archetypal
illustration of the Pyramid of the Living is known for its ascending
hierarchy from rocks to plants to animals to humans.7 2 But the second half
of the pyramid goes back down with human examples, from the academic
living a life of contemplative virtue; to the luxuriant sensualist who like
an animal lives and feels but does not think; to the wine-besot glutton
who like a plant neither thinks nor feels; to the apathetic sloth who like a
rock does not even live, but merely exists. Right here, in this somewhat
literal discursive root of hierarchical thinking about persons and things, de
Bovelles saw thingness (and therefore sin) in humans.
The person-thing distinction has been particularly weaponized in the
service of oppression. For example, the "emotionality" of women was
taken to be a failure to live up to the ideal of the rational human, on which
sort of basis the oppression of women was ideologically reproduced. The
construction of "blacks" in America as a separate race, more bestial than
"whites," can be read as a similar story.7 3 The problem is not simply that
more "things" need to be persons; the problem is that the person-thing
distinction will always be used to oppress, used to oppress persons as well
as things. Abolitionists strengthen this divide when their arguments assert
that it is inappropriate to respect things, properly classified. 4
Just as the view of property implicit in the abolitionist argument
misses the many duties people have in respect of property, its implicit
view of personhood misses the many restrictions on persons' effective
72.

From The Book of Wisdom, published in 1509: see Stefano Mancuso, Brilliant Green

(Washington: Island Press, 2015, Alessandra Viola trans) at 18.
73. MacKinnon, supra note 40; Charles W Mills, "Bestial Inferiority: Locating Simianization within
Racism" in Wulf D Hund, Charles W Mills & Silvia Sebastiani, eds, Simianization: Apes, Gender
Class, andRace (Zirich: LIT, 2015) 19 argues that simianization was part of demonization, blacks as
not just non-human but inhuman devils; Delicia Dunham, "On Being Black and Vegan" in A Breeze
Harper, ed, Sistah Vegan: Black Female Vegans Speak on Food, Identity, Health, and Society (New

York: Lantern Books, 2010) 42 at 45-46.
74. Compare for instance Wendy Adams' argument about heritage buildings, discussed at note 64
above. Specific projects like the move to recognise great apes as persons based on their cognitive
functions also have the risk of ceding ground lower on the Pyramid of the Living. If personhood is won
for chimpanzees on the basis that chimpanzees have complex cognitive capacities like moral agency,
what room is there for the chicken advocate? Gary Francione himself has identified this issue with
the line of argument: "Efforts like [the Great Ape Project] are problematic because they suggest that
a certain species of nonhuman is 'special' based on similarity to humans. That does not challenge the
speciesist hierarchy-it reinforces it": Gary L Francione, "The Great Ape Project: Not so Great" (20
December 2006), online: <http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/the-great-ape-project-not-so-great/>.
Francione is, however, comfortable with this same line of argument so long as one uses the correct
criterion to separate persons from things. He believes that his sentience criterion is the correct one,
while those drawing the line elsewhere (e.g., at moral agency) are wrong.
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freedom." Simply put, although our legal system ought to actualise the
freedom of each person, it does not. At best it actualises a specific view of
freedom founded on the ideas of independence and unconstrained choice,
a view of freedom that has long been under attack by communitarians,
feminists, and others critical of the liberal tradition.7 6 Why should we
expect personhood or rights to be a balm for animals if they are already
fundamentally exploitative of some humans?
More generally, Reva Siegel has argued that the history of civil rights
and feminist struggle in the USA illustrates a process of "preservation
[of oppressive institutions] through transformation."" Many real legal
victories were won-both women and racialised people went from being
property (albeit, in different senses) to being the possessors of full formal
rights. But the oppressive status regimes continued, in effect, through new
legal forms. Jim Crow enforced the previous status relations of racialised
people (and the current criminal law system in the USA arguably serves the
same function"), while new doctrines of privacy within marriage allowed
husbands to continue sexual violence and control of their wives. Further,
this "modernization" from explicitly status-based oppression to new forms
may have had the effect of quelling dissent-making the status quo seem
liberal-effectively privatizing oppression and shifting the blame to the
oppressed groups for failing to advance in a world of equal opportunities.7 9

&

75. Robert Garner expresses a similar skepticism: "there is an assumption amongst many animal law
scholars, and many in the animal rights movement, that abolishing the legal status of animals as the
property of humans will open the door to an animal rights Garden of Eden where liberated animals will
cease to be systematically exploited by humans": Garner 2005, infra note 88 at 43-44.
76. Nedelsky, supra note 8, summarises many of these critiques in constructing an alternative vision
of freedom. To give but one example (not from Nedelsky), Carole Pateman has argued that a contract,
despite existing between persons equal under the law, is legalised subjugation: The Sexual Contract
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988) and Carole Pateman & Charles Mills, Contract
Domination (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). In law a human is understood as the owner of her body,
but contracts involving property in the body-employment, marriage-are special. They transfer
rights regarding our bodies to others. For this reason, an employment contract is not an exchange,
rather it creates a relationship in which the body of one is for the use of the other, a relationship of
domination and subjugation.
77. Reva Siegel, "'The Rule of Love': Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy" (1996) 105:8 Yale
LJ 2117.
78. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarcerationin the Age of Colorblindness (New
York: The New Press, 2010).
79.
See Mary Joe Frug, Postmodern Legal Feminism (New York: Routledge, 1992) at 3-12 for
a classic treatment of the sameness/difference debate within feminism, illustrating that even when
"equal rights" are the agreed goal, important differences remain This critique is picked up in the
animal context by Taimie L Bryant, "Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals
Be Like Humans to Be Legally Protected from Humans?" (2007) 70:1 Law & Contemp Probs 207.
Carole J Adams makes the more fundamental criticism that we should not expect liberalism to
contain the resources needed for the sort of transformative change animal advocates seek; rather,
liberalism has defined each of manhood and humanhood in opposition to both woman and animal:
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All this is to say, the idea that changing the legal status of non-human
animals to "person" will lead to the abolition of their use, exploitation, or
oppression should be treated with suspicion. I do not mean to suggest that
formal rights for animals have no place,so only that if non-humans achieve
such legal victories it will not mean much without an on-going praxis that
can consolidate anti-oppressive norms.
3. Disconnexion
Let us now look past the practical difficulties I have just outlined with
abolitionism's chosen project, and imagine that it can effect its singular
aim. Abolitionism seeks disconnexion, and this avoids the two goods of
connexion. Extinguished animals willbe unable to form agentic relationships
with each other: abolitionism cannot imagine good lives for these animals
living together." If we reject human assistance as wrongful interference,
then enabled agency is impossible. This uncritically adopts problematic
views of the indignity of dependence: the idea that to be dependent on
others is to be debased.82 The most straight-forward rejoinder to this is:
we are all dependent whether we like it or not.83 Abolitionism imagines
disconnected non-domesticated animals living in the wild as independent,
when such animals depend on food sources, breeding strategies, and other
environmental factors that may well be less autonomy-enhancing than
what appropriately incentivized humans could arrange." The potential of
animals acting with respect to humans is missed, and so there can never
be an opportunity for humans to learn what dependent animals need in
order to live full lives together." We also lose opportunities for surprising
"After MacKinnon: Sexual Inequality in the Animal Movement" in Sanbonmatsu, supra note 71 at
257 ["Adams 2011"].
80. To my mind, the definitive response to the occasional rights-skepticism one sees in legal theory
was provided by Patricia J Williams in TheAlchemy ofRace andRights(Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1991) at, e.g., 150-152, concluding: "For blacks, then, the battle is not deconstructing rights, in
a world of no rights; nor of constructing statements of need, in a world of abundantly apparent need.
Rather the goal is to find a political mechanism that can confront the denialof need. The argument that
rights are disutile, even harmful, trivializes this aspect ofblack experience specifically, as well as that
of any person or group whose vulnerability has been truly protected by rights."
81. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 at 81.
82. This is not an idea that is often made explicit, rather it is an implication of the underlying
idea of freedom as freedom from interaction with others. Relatively explicit, we have Francione in
Francione & Garner, supranote 55 at 79: "However well we treat our nonhuman companions, they are
completely dependent on humans for every aspect of their existence, and the best of living situations
still involve what is a very unnatural situation for these animals."
83. Nedelsky, supra note 8, deals with dependence and the myth of the bounded self in chs 2-3; see
also Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 at 82-85.
84. Adriano Mannino, "Humanitarian Intervention in Nature: Crucial Questions and Probable
Answers" (2015) 3:1 Relations 109, goes further, arguing that humans may have an obligation to
make large-scale interventions in nature in order to reduce the suffering of wild animals.
85. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Make It So, supra note 32 at 96. An example: so-called free range
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animal-animal connexions. Donaldson and Kymlicka give an example
in which urban coyotes intimidate cats from hunting, thereby preserving
songbird populations.8 6
Nor, in this view, can there be anything of value in a creative or loving
human-animal relationship. This is partly a failure to imagine a good life for
animals, but also it means that the further the abolitionist project advances the
fewer affective resources advocates will have to call upon.
Even human-to-human connexion is missing from abolitionism. I
refer to the kinds of connexion that can forge and sustain a movement.
What brings animal advocates together is caring for animals." How does
extinctionist abolitionism imagine, in the distant twilight of animal-human
connexion, that humans will be motivated to maintain the laws and norms
set up against animal exploitation? Because, of course, until we have all
moved into anti-septic space bubbles there will still be animals, even
formerly mass-produced animals, in need of sequester. Do we foresee
two grey animal advocates huddled together, perhaps over a heavy drink,
imagining the animals they once cared for, now almost entirely gone? Do
we see those two inflamed with the passion that will be needed to ensure
no do-gooder amends the laws against raising a kind of animal that they
can hardly describe? Even when the do-gooder only wants a companion?
None of this is to say that legal personhood or the abolition of specific
animal-related practices should not be pursued. Whether one's animal
advocacy goal is to move toward abolition of human-animal interaction or

chickens are given an opportunity to go outside. However they generally stay in for a variety of
reasons, so that some have suggested that free range is more of a marketing ploy than a real increase in
chicken welfare: Ann Hui, "The Cage-Free Egg Trend: Is It Just a Shell Game?," Globe and Mail (20
March 2017), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/is-the-free-range-egg-trendreally-just-a-shell-game/article29797385/>, quoting an interview with Temple Grandin. However,
other farmers have begun to raise slower-growing, smaller chickenbreeds: Chris Nuttall-Smith, "Why
Slow-Growing Chickens Are the Next Big Thing," Lucky Peach (accessed 15 April 2017), online:
<http://luckypeach.com/slow-growing-chickens-next-big-thing/> (available through the Internet
Archive at <http://web.archive.org/web/20170604140600/http://luckypeach.com/slow-growingchickens-next-big-thing/>). Nuttall-Smith, interviewing one of these farmers, writes, "He laughed
when I asked how his birds are different from the commodity ones sired by his grandfather's rooster.
He noted the same things Pitman had-that they walked with ease and perched up high, and foraged
and dust-bathed like real chickens. And when he opens the barn doors to let them outside, his slowgrowers line up 'like third graders at recess. You can tell that the genetics brought this to the bird. It's
kind of like you brought back its natural characteristics or instincts.. It's almost like they're athletes
instead of couch potatoes."' This example touches on the vexed question of whether or how it might
be appropriate for humans to influence the breeding of animals, but my point with raising it here is that
these chickens' preferences could only have been noticed because they were connected to an attentive
farmer and given opportunities to express them: space to dust-bath, an open door, etc. How close are
current chicken breeds to relatively fulfilling, less "unnatural" lives (see supra note 82)? Following an
abolitionist programme, we would never know.
86. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 at 247.
87. Ibid at 79.
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toward humans and animals living together in non-violent interdependence
(as in the political visions I am about to discuss), connexion helps us get
there. Connexion, affective relationships with animals enacting enabled
agency, can bring us closer to a world where the more extreme aims of
abolitionists become feasible. But we should be careful as we go that
partial abolitionist successes that foster disconnexion are not actually
counter-productive.
III. Two political theories ofanimals through the lens of connexion
Much political theory has been written about animals," but only rarely
does it include a general story of a liveable political and legal order that
respects humans and animals. Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, and
Robert Gamer, have recently constructed political theories of animals with
such stories, and here I will evaluate these through the lens of connexion.
A political theory is implicit in all activism: the person striving for change
has some sense that the change they want will be part of a new and
improved political order. To gamer support, this political order must not
be so fanciful that people are put off striving for it as a matter of practical
politics. The support of political theorists is needed to keep the project
going, but we also need the support of people more generally-voters
and activists-because if they do not see a good life for themselves in a
theory they will not struggle to advance it. Because of the importance of
the goods of connexion, a successful political theory should have a robust
place for humans and animals connected together.
1. Garner A Theory of Justice for Animals
The challenge in creating an animal political theory is to produce a
political theory unlike others in one detail: the political theory of animals
must manifest some recognition of animals' moral importance. Robert
Gamer has argued that the most promising route for such a project is to
take current mainstream theories and add animals into the mix, rather than
to try something more radical.89 He followed through on this argument by
constructing such a theory in his A Theory ofJusticefor Animals.90
It is not enough to produce an elaborate conceptual apparatus and
expect it to be convincing to people and self-supporting on the solidity of

88. For a review, see Robert Garner, The PoliticalTheory ofAnimalRights (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2005) ["Garner 2005"]. This review has become dated by the recent explosion of the
political turn. More recent surveys and selections can be found in Cavalierir, Politics ofLiberation,
supra note 3, and Wissenburg & Schlosberg, supra note 4.
89. Garner 2005, supra note 88 at 157-158.
90. Garner 2013, supra note 6.
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its logic (a fact Gamer understands91 ). It is illustrative that what Gamer
describes as the (academic) ethical consensus on the moral importance of
animals9 2 is not reflected in the practices of most people. This is a problem
that has now received many diagnoses, particularly in political turn
scholarship that notes the need for a theory to incorporate self-preserving
structure. But in Gamer's own diagnosis, the issue is that stricter views
than his are too radical, cannot be popular, and so do not represent a
"realistic utopia."93 Thus he situates the problem right back in people's
conscious moral beliefs.94 Although palatable, his theory is nutritionally
deficient: it does not give animal advocates practical guidance on how to
proceed beyond the stalemate of abolitionist efforts.
A political theory should elaborate a structure of relations that will
support itself That is, in telling a story about a political order, an important
plot point to include is what normative practices within society will enforce
the beliefs and produce the practices that are needed to sustain the order.
No number of rights in law books can stop subjugation on their own. We
must also imagine a role for animals and/or their advocates that will cause
animal liberation to be popular, and in a continuing way.
Gamer rejects a relational approach, and so forecloses an important
route-the building of connexion between humans and animals.95 There
is no necessary connexion between rejecting a relational approach to
justice and failing to recognise the political uses of relationships-both to
motivate humans who love animals and to allow for animal deliberation.
However, in minimizing the relational approach as a "supplement" to
his capacity-oriented approach,96 Gamer does in fact miss the political
importance of relations with all sorts of animals. While he recognises that
"many humans do have relationships with animals that enrich the lives of

91. Gamer 2013, ibid at 123-141. It is partially on these grounds that Garner rejects the abolitionist
approach, at 118-121; as do Donaldson and Kymlicka in Donaldson& Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note
7 at 77-89.
92. Francione & Garner, supra note 55 at ix-x, Gamer 2005 supra note 88 at 10.
93. Gamer 2013, supra note 6 at 119.
94. I thus agree with Smulewicz-Zucker's critique of Gamer: that Gamer's theory reduces to a politics
of moral persuasion, a person-oriented rather than state-oriented politics that has already fumbled:
supra note 3 at 255-257. Smulewicz-Zucker also applies this critique to Donaldson & Kymlicka, but
there I disagree. In my view, Smulewicz-Zucker too quickly goes from "persuasion in a democratic
public sphere" to "moral persuasion" (257). But why must "persuasion" be "moral persuasion"? As
a result of this elision, they miss the other kinds of persuasion, or preference-changing more broadly,
which Donaldson & Kymlicka's theory allows. Two of these other kinds of persuasion are precisely
the goods of connexion: the affective power of human-animal connexion and the ability of animals
themselves to persuade through a process of living-with.
95. Gamer 2013, supra note 6 at 100.
96. Gamer 2013, ibid at 105.
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both the human and the animal involved," this does not seem to him to be
important for his theory.9 7
Garner may be in Carole J Adams' mind when she argues that animal
advocates have distanced themselves from feminism by privileging
"rational man," both as the assimilationist model for a rights-bearing
animal and as the ideal author of scholarship about animals: "the animal
movement reiterates a patriarchal disavowal of emotions as having a
legitimate role in theory making."98 It is possible to read my criticism
of Garner in this way: he pays insufficient attention to the possibilities
offered by affective relationships between humans and animals as a source
of motivation and direction for change.
2. Donaldson and Kymlicka 's Zoopolis
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka produce a more useful political theory
of animals in Zoopolis.99 They take an explicitly relational approach,0 0 and
argue that we should classify groups of animals based on their relationships
with humans, putting connexion centre-stage. Their three major
classifications are domesticated animals, who live in close relationships
of interdependence with humans; wild animals, who live "out there" on
97. Garner 2013, ibid at 138. Gamer addresses ideal and non-ideal theory. He writes that his nonideal "sentience position does not have to get involved in debates about whether an animal rights
ethic precludes owning animals as pets or companion animals.... [T]he sentience position...is not at
odds with the fact that many humans do have relationships with animals that enrich the lives of both
the human and the animal involved..." See also 121. The ideal theory Gamer espouses, an "enhanced
sentience position," may well rule out such relationships entirely, at least in so far as they constrain
animals' liberty, at 133-134. Thus Gamer's positions, while perhaps not ruling out connexion, do not
recognize or cash out its value.
98. Adams 2011, supra note 79 at 260-261. Adams did not have Gamer's 2013 work in mind when
writing in 2011, but his previous work, including Gamer 2005, supra note 88, consistently rejects
illiberal approaches.
99.

Zoopolis supra note 7.

100. Garner insists that Donaldson and Kymlicka in fact rely on a capacity approach, and that their
relational analysis serves only as a minor supplement to deal withthe edge case of companion animals:
"this is because their starting point is the acceptance, as a baseline, of a traditional species-egalitarian
abolitionist animal rights agenda based on a capacity-oriented ethic... .This has the effect of ruling
out of account the domestication of animals for exploitative human purposes... .When Donaldson
and Kymlicka talk about those animals who should be regarded as citizens, then, [as opposed to as
denizens or foreign nationals,] they are only referring to companion animals": Gamer 2013, supra
note 6 at 102. Gamer is mistaken. Donaldson and Kymlicka explicitly embrace the possibility of
citizenship-style relationships with domesticated animals such as chickens, as I discuss in more detail
below: Donaldson& Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 at 134-139. Gamer may have elidedDonaldson
and Kymlicka's (relational) approach to political theory with their (less relational) approach to rights,
which forms the brunt of Zoopolis ch 2. On my reading, Donaldson and Kymlicka do draw on nonrelational conceptual resources to ground their defence of universal basic rights for animals in ch 2,
but the rest of their book concems their political theory, which is thoroughly relational. Gamer repeats
this line of argument in "Animals, Politics, and Democracy," in The PoliticalTurn, supra note 1, 103
at 113. To my knowledge, neither Donaldson nor Kymlicka has responded to Garner's critique of their
work.
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their own and can reasonably be left alone most of the time; and liminal
animals-like squirrels, raccoons and pigeons-who live among humans
and may depend on our built environments, but who are often regarded as
invaders or interlopers and not depended on by humans in any purposeful
way. Donaldson and Kymlicka analogise these three groups, respectively,
to citizens of our country, foreigners (citizens of a separate, environmental
country, an "animal kingdom"), and denizens.10 1 Among humans, denizens
represent a category of people living within a country who are in some
sense not full participants in that state as citizens-perhaps because they
are permanent residents, "illegal aliens," or an isolationist community like
the Amish in Canada.
Making this analogy allows us to call on the resources of citizenship
theory and international law to answer questions about how to deal with
animals. For instance, if we respect wild animals as forming their own
sovereign "animal kingdom," we ought to insist on non-intervention as
a rule,102 but allow that intervention may occasionally be appropriate on
"humanitarian" grounds 103-particularly if some population constitutes
something like a "failed state." 0 ' Similarly, if we think of liminal animals
as denizens, we will turn to questions surrounding human denizens for
guidance. Human denizenship is "inherently prone to exploitation" 0 5 for
Donaldson and Kymlicka, and they identify three necessary elements of a
just denizenship policy: security of residency, reciprocity of denizenship
(a "reciprocal reduction of citizenship benefits and burdens" 106 -getting a
fair "deal" rather than all the burdens of citizenship without the benefits),
and anti-stigma safeguards, such as anti-discrimination legislation. 10 7
These ideas, taken from issues surrounding human denizenship, can be
applied to how we treat liminal animals.
101. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 at chs 5, 6, and 7.
102. Note that I am using the word "ought" advisedly. We don't, of course, always respect the
sovereignty of foreign nations, but we do have a relatively thorough idea of what respecting the
sovereignty of foreign nations would look like, and this is the power of Donaldson and Kymlicka's
analogy.
103. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 at 186-187. Hadley, supra note 54, argues
that instead of seeing wild animals as forming a separate sovereignty, we should see them as
having property rights to wild lands within our sovereignty, at 84-93, 124. I need not adjudicate this
dispute, particularly as Hadley concludes that there will be little practical difference between the
two approaches. Pursuing a wild animal sovereignty programme will require a very similar project
of institutional design, including "theories of guardianship and territorial determination substantially
similar" to the property rights institutions Hadley outlines.
104. Mannino argues that, actually, most animal populations are more like failed states obliging
human intervention (if it is possible to intervene effectively): supra note 84 at 110-113.
105. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 at 239.
106. Donaldson & Kymlicka, ibid at 240.
107. Donaldson & Kymlicka, ibid at 239-240.
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Donaldson and Kymlicka's view of domestic animals as citizens is in
part a recognition of the place animals already have in our society. Animals
are contributing members here among us: they work and produce, we
consume their labour, their products, and in many cases their bodies. We
take. Citizenship, conceived as a fair deal between citizens and the state,
requires that we give in equal measure. What would constitute a fair deal
for animals, who currently give as much as any living being can to the
wealth of our nations but receive so little in return?
Note that this theory, as out-landish as the terminology of animal
citizens and animal kingdoms may seem, is not so far from how we
understand the world today. Think ofthe way we treat companion animals.
The special legal treatment of pets, vis-a-vis other animals, has been noted
before.108 Pets are protected from some violence in the criminal code (in
offences from which farm animals are effectively excluded),10 9 and they
are protected from a number of wrongs indirectly through the tort claims
of their owners.110 Some pets have come the closest of any non-human
animals to owning property through the function of the trust.' Family law
courts have sometimes shown a willingness to consider the best interests
of a pet in determining where they should end up living following a
separation of their owners.1 12 Pets already receive a marginal citizenship.
Examining the theory in reverse, witness the similarity in the way
we treat some humans to the way we treat the liminal animal "denizens"
of Donaldson and Kymlicka's theory. For example, an invention meant
to stop pigeons from defecating in certain places-the placing of a set
of spikes in an otherwise comfortable position-is now being used to
stop homeless people from sleeping near the haunts of the wealthy.1 1 3 I
cannot imagine a better case for Garner's argument that in fact we do treat
"marginal" humans like animals already.1
108. Tony Milligan, Beyond Animal Rights (London: Continuum, 2010) at 108; Lesli Bisgould,
Animals and the Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) 1-4.

109. Bisgould, ibid at 67-87.
110. Ibid at 137-141.
111. Ibid at 157-160.
112. Ibid at 154-157.
113. David Batty, "Anti-homeless studs at London residential block prompt uproar," The Guardian (7
June 2014), online: <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jun/07/anti-homeless-studs-londonblock-uproar>.
114. Garner 2013, supra note 6 at 159-160; and see Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 at
294 note 3. Garner's argument is in the context of a discussion of the "argument from marginal cases"
and I have interpreted him liberally here. He uses "marginal human" to mean a human who is like
an animal in that they have a limited ability to reason or choose, whether due to disability, injury, or
extreme youth. This is a contentious use of "marginal" that I worry might encourage some problematic
stances. I am using marginal to mean socially on the margins. As I have noted above, however (see text
accompanying notes 71-73), the idea of the subhuman has always been a mess ofputatively "physical"
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Lastly, if we think of wild animals as forming sovereign states it
becomes clear that we humans interact with them as colonialists.11" We
use the supposed savagery of the animal kingdom as grounds to conclude
they have no meaningful "state" and are themselves also meaningless,
so that there is no wrong in killing them and using their land. Imagining
animals as non-people is just as necessary to the myth of terra nullius as
is so imagining the aboriginal inhabitants. There are parallels between the
on-going movement to recognise sovereignty for at least some aboriginal
communities in Canada and the movementto recognise animals as political,
but these are tricky and perhaps dangerous to draw out in a context where
animal/aboriginal analogies are still used to oppress.1 1 6
As such, Donaldson and Kymlicka's story is not a bad fit with
our current conceptual situation. This makes it more imaginable and
achievable, and less politically risky. Moreover, Donaldson and Kymlicka
throughout their work share imaginative visions of flourishing animals
living together in connexion with humans. They do not rule out the
human use of animal products such as eggs and dairy,1 17 though the
production of these would have to be radically transformed in order to
cohere with respect for chickens and cows. And, it might turn out that
the cost of producing certain animal products in respectful ways will be
so high that only a limited luxury market, or no market, in these products
will exist.' 8 The pressures of commercialising a product such as eggs
are substantial, and legal and non-legal mechanisms would be needed
in order to ensure an appropriate line was drawn between use of animal
products and exploitation. But all of Donaldson and Kymlicka's imagined
futures are subject to healthy democratic disclaimers: "there is room here
for reasonable disagreement."1 1 9 We might trust democratic processes to
draw the lines if these processes are well-structured and, in particular, give
due weight to animal perspectives-something that can only be achieved
through a connected, enabled agency.

or "biological" factors and social factors.
115. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 at 168-170.
116. Will Kymlicka & Sue Donaldson, "Animal Rights and Aboriginal Rights" in Vaughan Black,
Peter Sankoff & Katie Sykes, eds, CanadianPerspectives on Animals and the Law (Toronto: Irwin

Law, 2015).
117. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 at 134-139. Alasdair Cochrane agrees, and
gives several other examples of potentially non-exploitative animal labour: wool production, manure
production, therapy and other assistance, carrying "messages and goods," guarding, sniffing, grazing,
dramatic performance... Cochrane, supra note 43 at 25-26.
118. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, ibid at 139.
119. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, ibid at 138.
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It is possible to have just relationships between citizens, denizens,
and foreign states. And so, Donaldson and Kymlicka have shown through
a powerful analogy how it is possible to have just relationships with
animals. The work now begins to turn this analogy into explicit legal
prescriptions.120 For instance, should domestic animals be given the legal
status of "citizens," currently reserved for certain humans, or should
we favour legal reforms that would bring non-human animals to a more
citizen-like recognition under a different category?121 Either way, there is a
potential here that the argument I made above concerning abolitionismlaw mistreats people too-could just as easily be made of Donaldson and
Kymlicka's theory: law mistreats citizens, denizens, and foreign states
too.122 But as I have shown, Donaldson and Kymlicka's theory provides a
framework for a praxis that can ground the kind of deeper social change
needed to give legal reforms real heft, because it foregrounds mutually
beneficial connexions between animals and humans.
Conclusion:Limits and extensions
Connexion is not everything. Although it provides a valuable tool for
judging political theories of animals and for deriving praxis therefrom, it
cannot be the whole story.
In economic terms, the goods of connexion will, it is hoped, encourage
pro-animal preferences and the motivation to act on those preferences.
Caring for animals and respecting their agency must be at the heart of our
aims and motivation as animal advocates. But even when people have
right preferences, there are barriers to them being expressed. These are
the sorts of structures that make it so hard to remain a vegan, or an ethical
farmer. McMullen convincingly outlines the way market pressures faced
by farmers, and market failures such as a lack of consumer information,
prevent even those who already care about animals from expressing that
120. While the claim in the body is about the analogy undergirding Zoopolis, Kymlicka, supra note
22, has recently developed another useful set of analogies that more immediately suggest explicit
legal prescriptions: likening some animals to family members and co-workers. This prompts calls for
reforms by analogy to family law (e.g., the best interests of an animal should be considered in deciding
who they should live with when their owners separate) and employment law (e.g. maximum hours of
work and a right to comfortable retirement). The importance of connexion to the viability of these
reforms is clear: cementing a reconceptualization of (some) animals as family members or co-workers
will be assisted by the regular perception of animals in these roles, and both these roles are defined by
membership in a close group with humans-animals as co-workers.
121. Wissenburg, "An agenda," supra note 4 at 36-37. Kymlicka, at least favours recognition of
intermediate categories of worker and family member for some animals on the way to recognition of
full legal personhood: supra note 22.
122. And following the analogy to family members and co-workers, discussed in note 120 above, law
mistreats workers and family members too. Attention to the injustices to be found in human family and
employment settings will assist in reform along these lines.
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care.123 The easiest way to make someone an animal lover is to make it
cheap. Removing bariers to expressing animal-regarding preferences can
also go some way to making such lifestyles more accessible, not just to the
privileged. Economics on the other hand, does not have much to say about
how right preferences are formed and maintained,124 and here is where
connexion comes into play.
It has been argued that the addition of an economic incentive to a
benign connexion poisons it, leading inexorably to exploitation.125 Others
have argued that market relations have been essential to the abstract,
impersonal respect of liberalism and all the goods that has brought. 126
I cannot judge this dispute here, on which much has been written in
human contexts. But it seems that non-economic factors can also lead to
exploitation. The seeing-eye dog undergoes harsh training, and this would
arguably occur in the absence of a direct money incentive as long as there
is another incentive to instrumentalizing dogs in this way: to assist people
with impaired vision. I would then tentatively suggest that the presence
or absence of economic incentives is both over- and under-inclusive as
a test for exploitative connexion. We cannot just pursue non-economic
connexion, 127 we still need other lenses, such as the freedom or dignity

of all, to guard against exploitation: connexion itself does not explain the
distinction between benign relationships and domination. Probably also,
animals require some kind of formalized representation in human political
processes. 128
The temptation for humans to exploit dependent animals, identified
by abolitionists, is real. As we pursue policies that foster connexion, it
is an ongoing challenge to structure that connexion in non-oppressive
ways. This is a challenge we simply must face if we are to have the goods
of connexion and so a viable praxis. Connexion is a partial framework,
123. Supra note 37 at chs 4-8. See also Aaltola, supra note 31, showing that our model of moral
psychology must include the social and the political: we must enable, as well as motivate, right action.
124. Not much, but not nothing: McMullen, supra note 37 at 79-80 and text accompanying notes 3739 above.
125. Supra note 39.
126. E.g., Deirdre McCloskey, The Bourgeois irtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2006).
127. McMullen, supra note 37, argues that maintaining markets in animals may be the best way,
(a) "to manage [the] transition" to an animal-friendly society; and, (b) to ensure that animal populations
are kept at appropriate levels after the transition: 184-187.
128. Cochrane suggests that working animals should have a labour union: supra note 43 at 27-28.
Parry argues for discursive representation: supra note 13; Garner canvasses different models of
enfranchisement: supra note 100; and Dan Lyons argues for "a significant government institutionfor example an Animal Protection Commission-to provide structural representation and political
resources for animal welfare": "Animal Protection Policy in the United Kingdom: From Symbolic
Reassurance to Democratic Representation" in Garner & O'Sullivan, supra note 1, 155.
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and can be complementary to the banning of specific practices and the
assertion of certain animal rights that may be necessary to ensure any
particular connexion is non-exploitative.1 2 9 If we focus on the goods of
connexion we will go some way toward avoiding exploitation, as any
human-animal connexion in which the human cares for the animal and
is attentive to their agency is on firm ground. But this is not the end of
the matter because caring for animals and even attending to their agency
cannot be the end of the story of their freedom.13 0 If there ever were an end
to that story, we would have denied animals' right to rewrite freedom for
themselves.1 3 1 Rather, the answers will emerge, can only emerge, from the
iterative interactions of us animals living together, and I offer connexion
as one more metaphor for the conversation.132
Speciesism is an unavoidable problem with this approach. Some
animals seem more charismatic to humans, easier to get into affective
relationships with (whether one- or two-sided). Much of this is cultural (as
a cross-cultural comparison demonstrates 3 3 ), but some of it is probably
down to deeper conditions.1 3 4 Similarly, while we may be post-humanishly
129. For instance, in so far as we are connected to animals as workers they might need labour rights
similar to those some human employees enjoy: see Cochrane, supra note 43 and Kymlicka, supra note
22.
130. See MacKinnon, supra note 40 and the text accompanying that note.
131. Nedelsky says that "to become autonomous is to come to be able to find and live in accordance
with one's own law"; "neither the self nor autonomy is static; it is never simply arrived at or achieved"
but a process: supra note 8 at 123, 50. Richard Rorty would have us "regard the realization of utopias,
and the envisaging of still further utopias, as an endless process-an endless, proliferating realization
of Freedom, rather than a convergence toward an already existing Truth": Contingency, irony, and
solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) at xvi.
132. Ifyou would say what it means for animals to have justice, you may insert it here. I only ask you
to attend to the trade-offs that pursuit of your ideal might have against the goods of connexion that
are necessary to effective animal advocacy. Personally, I advance "connexion" precisely because it
seems to me to help frame the questions rather than purporting to answer them for all time and in the
abstract, as a formulation like "animals as persons" might aim to do. My method follows Rorty, ibid
at 9: "Interesting philosophy.. [usually is], implicitly or explicitly, a contest between an entrenched
vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises
great things.... The method is to redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have created
a pattern of linguistic behaviour which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing
them to look for appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic behaviour, for example, the adoption of new
scientific equipment or new social institutions."
133. Peter B Gray & SharonM Young, "Human-Pet Dynamics in Cross-Cultural Perspective" (2011)
24:1 Anthrozoss 17.
134. Gray & Young, ibid at 24: "Almost all pets [across 60 sampled societies] were mammals; birds
and a few reptiles rounded out the sample. Our shared phylogenetic heritage as mammals might make
the emotional expressiveness and appearance of fellow mammals more generally appealing when
keeping a pet, especially compared with reptiles, fish, or insects. The well-recognized social cognitive
abilities of dogs and nonhuman primates might additionally help account for human interest in them
as pets. The birds kept as pets were often ones that possess higher cognitive capacities (e.g., keeping
notoriously smart parrots, ravens, and eagles, rather than turkeys or quail), perhaps a reason based on
cognitive convergence for their appeal as pets rather than phylogeny. As an illustration of the latter,
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reticent about drawing a cut-off for agency anywhere on the Pyramid of
the Living or even below it,13 5 it is clear that some animals and things are
more readily agentic in ways intelligible to humans than others. It is at
least more intuitive to think of a dog as an actor making choices than a
tree, or even than a hymenopter who is more usually seen as an automaton
stepping out her instinctual programming. Our best hope might be that
charismatic animals act as ambassadors for, say, hagfish, which on top of
everything else are gross.13 6 While this is a challenge to a connexion-based
approach I do not think it is fatal. Because how can we imagine effective
pro-hagfish advocacy without intermediary steps improving humans' feel
for animals generally? Humans have a remarkable aptitude for living out
contradictory responses to animals between and even within species and
this absolutely should give us pause, 13 7 but again this shows only that
connexion is not a sufficient, rather than not a necessary, ingredient in a
recipe for effective change.
I turn now to extensions of the praxis suggested by connexion. One
reform I offer as emblematic of this praxis is the legalization of backyard chicken coops. As Donaldson and Kymlicka argue, the consumption
of chicken eggs is not inherently exploitative.138 Unlike for instance the
production of milk by cows, chickens do not make use of most of their
eggs. "Domesticated hens produce many eggs. They could be allowed to
incubate some fertilized eggs, and have the opportunity to raise young,
and yet still have many surplus eggs."13 9 We can avoid the slaughter of
male chicks not needed for eggs by identifying the sex of eggs and giving
hens primarily female eggs to incubate.140 The chickens would receive
food, shelter, protection, and medical attention, while being allowed to
do all the things chickens seem to like to do: scratch, socialise, mate,
and hatch and raise young.' 1 But moreover, the back-yard chicken coop
parrots and parakeets were trained to talk among the Yanomamo of South America, one reason they
were enjoyed as pets" (citations omitted).
135. See, e.g., Mancuso, supra note 72, arguing that plants are intelligent.
136. "Widely considered the most disgusting animals in the ocean, if not on earth": Hannah Waters,
"14 Fun Facts About Hagfish," Smithsonian Magazine (17 October 2012), online: <https://www.
smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/14-fun-facts-about-hagfish-77165589/>. No citation is given by
Waters for this remarkable claim, and, in my view, it likely reflects nothing more than anti-hagfish
bias.
137. Erica Ritter canvasses many in The Dog by the Cradle, the Serpent Beneath: Some Paradoxesof

Human-AnimalRelationships(Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2009).
138. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, supra note 7 at 138. See also the other potentially nonexploitative labours given by Cochrane, supra note 43.
139. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, ibid at 138.
140. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Zoopolis, ibid.
141. Karen Davis offers a moving description of the things chickens seem to like to do in "The Mental
Life of Chickens as Observed Through Their Social Relationships" in Julie A Smith & Robert W
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would have an effect on the neighbourhood. Some children would be
enamoured. Neighbours would complain about the smell, but most would
be mollified with the occasional batch of fresh eggs (as I understand to
be the practice in Toronto today if one wants to avoid a complaint to the
city 42 ). People would come to learn that chickens-with their smells, their
noises, their sociality-are necessary to eggs.143 The chickens would be
back-yard ambassadors for farm animals. Encouraging urban agriculture,
attending to space and zoning, if done with an eye on intersectionality,
may go some way towards alleviating concerns with food deserts and
the inaccessibility of animal-regarding lifestyles to the under-employed.
This example highlights how a law-the municipal ban on back-yard
chickens"'-serves to structure human/non-human relationships in a way
which promotes disconnexion, the objectification of chickens and the
commodification of their eggs.
Of course, even this harmless-sounding strategy brings its own risks.
If only hens and not roosters are allowed to be kept, or if too few chickens
are allowed to form a proper social group," the chickens may be missing
some component of flourishing. What will be done with hens when their
laying slows? The regular farm practice of sending them to slaughter
Mitchell, eds, ExperiencingAnimal Minds: An Anthology ofAnimal-Human Encounters (New York:

Columbia University Press, 2012) 13. Facilitating these would no doubt require and motivate debreeding chickens out of the pathologies into which they have been bred. As Karen Davis notes in
another work, much of the violence we do to a chicken "is built into [their] genome." Thus, "[e]ven
if you rescue a chicken from the poultry shed when the bird is only a day or two old and provide the
seemingly healthy little creature with wholesome food, fresh air, and compassionate care, the genetic
pathologies built into it will begin to emerge in the form of cardiovascular disease, gastrointestinal
disorders, crippled joints, and unnatural gaits": "Anthropomorphic Visions of Chickens Bred for
Human Consumption" in Sorenson, supra note 30, 169 at 174, 172-173. See also the example of slowgrowing chickens given at note 85 above.
142. Toronto Chickens is a community website with tips on keeping chickens in Toronto, and
materials for a campaign to change the prohibitive by-law: <http://torontochickens.com/blog/>. The
City commissioned a report, "Feasibility of allowing back-yard hens in Toronto," but the Licensing
Standards Committee latervoted to not read the report: Committee Decision LS11.2, 25 January 2012,
online: <http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaltemHistory.do?item=2012.LS11.2>. As this article
was being revised, there were reports of an impending vote on a pilot project to study the feasibility
of back-yard coops, possibly to be held in Autumn of 2017: "Time for Toronto to Make Backyard
Chickens Legal: Editorial," The Toronto Star (11 July 2017), online: <https://www.thestar.com/
opinion/editorials/2017/07/1 1/time-for-toronto-to-make-backyard-chickens-legal-editorial.html>.
143. Note that even those nearby cities which allow keeping chickens usually only allow keeping
hens, making a good life for back-yard chickens difficult or impossible: <http://torontochickens.com/
where-are-chickens-legal/>. Allowing hens in back-yards would be a step, but allowing all chickens
would be important to a full understanding by human communities of chicken lives.
144. Specifically, it is a ban on keeping chickens in the city other than in certain excepted areas
(notably slaughterhouses). Toronto Municipal Code c 349, Animals, 13 June 2013, online: <http://
www.toronto.ca/legdocs/municode/1184_349.pdf> §§ 349-2 and 349-4.
145. These restrictions are common even in cities that allow some hens and so are potential sites for
reform efforts.
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may be inconsistent with the development of affective relationships with
hens and may naturalize their exploitation, on top of being a harm and a
violation of their autonomy. Requiring that hens be provided for through
a "retirement" could encourage connexion and promote the better kind
of relationship we want. How much space will a given chicken need, or
desire? What constitutes an appropriate level of medical care? Pet owners
already make difficult decisions in attempting to balance their pet's comfort
against limited funds-just as we make with human health care decisions.
The connexion frame does not offer moral answers to these questions,
which seek appropriate balances among the interests of interdependent
beings. Rather, fostering human-chicken connexion is hoped to motivate
humans to provide for their chickens' comfort and to help them better
understand, through attention to the chickens, things like how best to
balance chickens' desire for space against other draws on scarce resources.
Here is a list of policy efforts that could promote the goods of
connexion. This is not a policy brief, and I am not in a position, here at
the end of the article, to provide a thorough explication of or motivation
for any given reform. I present this list for two reasons. First, I hope to
continue the discussion about how to do connexion well. Each of these
suggestions comes with more or less obvious dangers, and we simply must
do the hard and collective work of living through how to connect together
with animals without exploitation. Second, I hope to demonstrate the use
of the connexion lens. These suggestions, some more than others, only
become salient as animal advocacy effort when we think of connexion as
an animal advocacy goal. If we were only to pursue animal rights through
direct means, for instance, there would be no place for visits to sanctuaries,
or for discussions of zoning, in an animal advocacy project. But if we care
about the goods of connexion, projects of this sort become important, even
necessary. The connexion lens gives relevance to what, under other lenses,
is ignored.
* Requiring that (factory) farms be open to the publicl4 6
* Companion animals in schools1 7
* Field trips to (factory) farms or to sanctuanies

146. This is already done in some places. England is taking a related step by requiring slaughterhouses
to be fitted with CCTV: Rebecca Smithers, "All Slaughterhouses in England to Have Compulsory
CCTV," The Guardian (11 August 2017), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/
aug/11/all-slaughterhouses-in-england-to-have-compulsory-cctv>.
147. We would need to be careful to choose animals with dispositions favourable to sizeable groups
of humans of the age-group in question. There are many difficulties here: Helena Pedersen, Animals
in Schools: Processesand Strategies in Human-Animal Education (West Lafayette: Purdue University

Press, 2010).
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* Advocating for advocates4 8
* Advocating against ag gag laws1 49
* Tax credits for support of dependent non-humans to financially
incentivize such connexions..o
* Tax credits or public insurance for veterinary services
* Funding for, access to, and volunteering incentives for fostering
programs and sanctuaries for rescued farm or retired service animals
* Intentional communities for animals and humans151
* Animal-friendly infrastructure, design, architecture encouraged
through building codes (and animal-accessible spaces are often
more accessible to diverse humans)
These are not utopian visions. They are policy and legal changes,
some quite small, that could be made now. The hope is for a snowball
effect: normalising the idea of animals around us, building connexions
between humans and non-humans-and thus both affective relationships
and sympathy, an understanding of our interdependencies, and enabled
agency. If we are ever to move toward a state where the moral worth of
all animals is respected, people need to see them first. This praxis does
nothing directly to advance animal "rights" 152-but these are the sort of
steps we need to take to advance the deliberative community and the
popular support required to make respect for animals sustainable.

148. As discussed above in note 43. Part of this is exposing current practices through access to
information requests (on behalf of activists) and protecting advocates from defamation suits by
corporations and industry groups within agriculture.
149. See supra note 50.
150. There are tax credits for dependent humans, but none for dependent non-humans. There appear
to be no income tax savings related to non-human animals, except where they are a deductible business
expense or a medical necessity: "How Much Does That Pet Cost in the Window?," TurboTax (blog),
online: <http://blog.turbotax.ca/are-pets-tax-deductible/>. A search of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985,
c 1 (5th Supp) and regulations for "animal" reveals references only to farming, breeding (in the course
of a farming business), and medical expense credits (for, e.g., seeing-eye dogs). There are no instances
of "pet" or "companion."
151. Donaldson & Kymlicka, Make It So, supra note 32 at 98-100.
152. For arguments against such indirect approaches to animal advocacy and, in my view, a decisive
riposte, see Hadley, supra note 54 at 106-109.

